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BRAZILIAN PRIVATE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE, 1950-1930* 
Introduction 
Brazil has now reached a fairly advanced stage of the industriali-
sation process. This is partly thown by comparisons with other LDCs 
having mixed-market economies and with developed countries such as 
Britain. For example, according to United Nations data, by the 
mid-1970s Brazilian production of basic industrial inputs such as 
steel ingots, and consumer durables such as passenger cars and 
refrigerators, was well ahead of comparable countries Mexico, India 
and Egypt. Production of these items also averaged about one-
third of the UK level.1 Industry now accounts for about 30% of 
GDF and manufactures have also risen in importance as earners of 
foreign exchange: figures for 1979 suggest that industrial exports 
earned US$8.5 billion out of US$15.2 billion export income.2 
An important factor in explaining Brazil's advanced position 
is its relatively long industrialisation experience, dating roughly 
from the last quarter of the 19th century (Wythe 1946; Dean 1969; 
Villela and Suzigan 1973). Yet, as Table 1 shows, it is during 
the past 30 years that perhaps the most dramatic changes have taken 
place in the manufacturing base. Ignoring for the moment intra-
industry changes, it can be seen that in 1950 the industrial mix 
was dominated by basic consumer non-durable sectors such as tex-
tiles, clothing, food and drink. Subsequently, this traditional 
group has declined in importance owing to the rapid expansion of 
the so-called 'dynamic1 industries, particularly within the sectors 
of metallurgy, machinery, chemicals, electrical-electronic and 
transport equipment. By 1975 these five sectors accounted for over 
50% of industrial production (by value) and 40% of industrial 
employment. Other figures also indicate that in recent years 
these same sectors have received three-quarters of industrial in-
vestment. Clearly, a number of other factors must be invoked to 
explain these essentially structural changes. Among the most 
important factors are State policy action, public enterprise and the 
expansion of foreign interests - especially multinational corpora-
tions - (Suzigan 1976; Vieira and Camargo 1976). 
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Implicitly, the course and style of the industrialisation pro-
cess from 1950-1980 has resulted in a subsidiary role for Brazilian 
private industrial enterprise (empresa privada nacional, or EPN). 
At a most basic level this is shown by the decline of traditional 
sectors, which are mostly in the hands of domestic capital, and the 
rise of the dynamic industries, which are largely dominated by 
state and foreign enterprises. More broadly, it is apparent that 
at the least, Brazilian concerns have met with a variety of 
challenges and problems, including: the possibility of denationali-
sation, new technologies, bureaucratic hazards, financial difficulties 
and other constraints of the country's rapidly-changing political 
economy. In detail, however, the impact of institutional and other 
factors upon key aspects of EPN organisation and spatial structure 
during the 1950-1980 period is still far from clear. The objective 
of the present paper is thus to sharpen understanding in this field. 
The paper is arranged in two parts. Part one outlines the 
broad components of the Brazilian industrial system. Emphasis is 
given to the growing public-sector role, the further international-
isation of the economic (and specifically, industrial) base and 
efforts to strengthen the Brazilian private sector. In part two, 
a variety of empirical evidence is presented for private Brazilian 
firms, giving due weight to both the large enterprises and the small 
and medium firms (or pequenas e medias empresas) which are most 
prevalent in the industrial structure. For its detailed analysis, 
part two draws upon the dynamic sector industries in particular. 
Survey data, documentary evidence and case studies supported, as 
appropriate, by published work, are used to illustrate specific 
aspects. Finally, some conclusions are drawn about the position 
and role of Brazilian private enterprise in the industrialisation 
process. 
Table 1 
Percentage shares of principal dynamic and traditional industries 
in total employment and value of production, 1950-1974. 
1950 1960 1970 1974 
Employment share 
Dynamic group 17.5 27.9 33.8 40.6 
Traditional group 50.8 40.7 34.4 31.9 
Value of production 
Dynamic group 21.5 36.6 45.8 54.0 
Traditional group 58.1 41.7 33.9 27.6 
Source: Industrial Census of Brazil for each year; 1974 data 
from Anuario Estatlstico 1976. 
Notes: (1) 1974 data excludes figures for firms with fewer than 
five employees. 
(2) The following sectors are included in each group: 
Dynamic group - metallurgy, machinery, electrical-electronic 
transport and chemicals (latter including plastics, pharma-
ceuticals, etc.,); Traditional group - textiles, clothing 
food and drink. 
PART ONE: COMPONENTS OF THE BRAZILIAN INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM 
(i) Broad spatial and economic trends 
Spatial trends 
Economic - and, specifically;, industrial - development in Brazil 
has been very uneven spatially. Of this fact, the literature 
leaves no doubt (see, for example: Furtado 1961, 1963; Gauthier 
and Semple 1974; Gilbert and Goodman 1976), although it might be 
suggested that in a country almost continent-sized, spatial 
inequalities are to be expected. In general terms, attention is 
drawn to the overall economic importance of the Southeast region. 
This importance can be traced back in historical time, but it is 
evident that recent industrial development has reinforced the econo-
mic standing of the Southeast vis-a-vis other regions. In 1970 
the Southeast accounted for over half the total number of industrial 
firms and 70% of the industrial employment. Sao Paulo state, which 
is the leading industrial state within the region., is also dominant 
nationally, having increased its share of total industrial em-
ployment from 35% in 1950 to 48% in 1970, although its share of 
firms fell slightly (Cunningham 1976). 
The general pattern of industrial concentration is even 
greater in the dynamic sectors referred to above. This can be 
seen on two main spatial levels. Firstly, in 1970 Sao Paulo state 
had almost 50% of all firms in these sectors and about 60% of 
the employment. Secondly, these industries are especially evident 
in metropolitan locations. For example, in 1970 the metropolitan 
areas of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro had two thirds and four fifths 
respectively of their state employment totals in these (dynamic) 
sectors. 
These trends do not deny the fact that industry has been 
growing in other parts of Brazil during the past 30 years (Kaddad 
1975; Hay 1979). Rather, they emphasise one specific aspect of 
the industrialisation process: the increasing dominance of large 
enterprises in both the spatial and structural dimensions. 
Given the growing importance of state and foreign interests among 
the largest concerns, and considering their market power, there 
are some far-reaching implications for the mass of small and medium 
private firms which account for over 90 % of industrial enterprises. 
Economic trends 
The greater part of the 1950-1980 period is served by a fairly 
wide literature (see, for example: Baer 1975; Bergsman 1970; 
Fishlow 1973; Furtado 1973; Robock 1975; Suzigan 1978; 
Tavares 1974). In spite of some minor differences in inter-
pretation of economic trends, there is basic agreement on 
fundamental points. Throughout the period manufacturing industry 
has been the leading sector of economic growth. Further, over 
the 30-year span a number of cycles of expansion and recession can 
be identified. According to Baer and Villela (1975), the 
following subdivisions can be made: 1947-1962 (the sixth stage 
in a series beginning with stage 1 at pre-World War 1), charac-
terised as a period of high economic growth rates, with average 
annual growth of GDP in excess of 6%, such rates being higher 
(7.8% p.a.) in the latter part of the period (1956-1962); 1962-
1967, characterised as a period of stagnation, with declining 
economic growth rates (averaging 3.4% p.a.) said to be caused 
by a drastic decline in industrial activity; and 1968-1973, 
characterised by rapid economic expansion, with average GDP 
growth of 9% p.a. and higher rates (11% plus p.a.) for industry.5 
while this sequence is generally corroborated by other 
evidence, the validity of treating 1947-1962 as a single unit 
might well be queried. In this respect, Rattner (1979) sharpens 
the focus by subdividing this period into three: 1947-1951, a 
period of expansion; 1952-1956, a recession; 1957-1961, a 
further period of expansion. No supporting evidence is given 
by Rattner, although the suggested patterns appear to be justified 
on the basis of annual GDP growth rates, and by those for manu-
facturing specifically. Thereafter, the sequence follows Baer 
and Villela, but for the addition of a final phase: recession 
beginning in 1974-1975. 
By world standards of GDP growth, the current phase of 
recession in Brazil has not yet seen very low or negative growth 
rates. Rather, there has been a marked decline in comparison 
with the spectacular rates achieved during the height of the 
'economic miracle' during 1968-1973. In 1973 GDP grew at 14%. 
This fell to 9.8% in 1974 and 5.6% in 1975. After what is 
believed to have been an inflation-led rise in 1976 (9.2%), 
annual rates for 1977-1979 were between 4.7% and 6.4%; pre-
liminary figures for 1980 suggest an economic growth rate of 7%. 
Industrial growth rates have also been reduced but the recent 
trends do not resemble the stagnation of the early to mid-1960s. 
However, the rapidly accelerating inflation rate is one feature 
in common with that former period. In 1979 the annual inflation 
was 92%, rising to over 100% during 1980.6 Yet, whereas in the 
early 1960s exhaustion of possibilities for 'easy' import sub-
stitution and political instability were invoked as causal factors, 
from 1973 the high cost of crude oil imports has been a major 
contributory factor to the inflationary process. 
From the political standpoint the 1950-1980 period can be 
divided almost equally into a civilian phase until 1964 and a 
military phase thereafter. While a variety of policy instruments 
and other measures have been used by post-1964 governments to 
expand the industrial base of the economy, the development model 
followed is rooted in the institutional framework begun in pre-
ceding years, especially under Vargas (both presidencies) and 
Kubitschek (Wirth 1970; Suzigan 1976, 1978). 
(ii) The increasing role of the state 
The Brazilian state has had a long-standing role as a provider 
of utilities and a supplier of basic industrial inputs. The 
period 1889-1945 was important in these respects, since early 
public enterprises were set up and the policy apparatus was 
expanded (Villela and Suzigan 1973). The 1930s comprised a 
critical phase. During the early 1930s industry replaced 
agriculture as the leading sector of economic growth (Baer 1965). 
Also, changes in the organisation of the military establishment 
heightened its role within the state apparatus and its influence 
upon the direction of economic-industrial policy (Wirth 1970; 
Hayes 1976). 
These earlier trends appear to have further significance in 
the 1950-1980 period. In the 1950s public-sector agencies such 
as the National Development Bank (BNDE) and Petrobras (the oil 
refining monopoly) were set up, while policies to stimulate pro-
duction of consumer durable goods began to be implemented. During 
the 1960s and 1970s state involvement intensified. Notably, 
the industrial policy matrix was expanded, and an industry ministry 
was introduced in 1960. With reference to public enterprises, 
a study carried out by the Fundagao Getulio Vargas in 1973 
indicated that, whereas in 1959 there was a total of about 130 
(two-thirds in the states, and the remainder at federal level), 
between 1960 and 1969 a further 214 came into being (FGV 1973). 
Suzigan (1976) stresses that this growth was largely a result of 
subsidiaries having been created by existing public enterprises.9 
As a further point, the growth of public sector expenditure is 
shown by Rezende (1974). He estimates that between 1947 and 
1969 (excluding state enterprises) this rose from 17.1% to nearly 
30% of GDP. Rezende also points out that this growth was not a 
continuous process, and identifies 1955-1960 and 1964-1969 as 
periods of rapid acceleration in public sector outgoings (p.26). 
By the mid-1970s, the scale of public sector expansion caused 
private interests to argue the case for some reduction in state 
participation: FIESP, the Sao Paulo Federation of Industries, was 
among the leading exponents of desestatizagao. Both the Geisel 
government (1974-1979) and the Figueiredo government which took 
power in March 1979 took up this issue. In the first half of 1979 
there was considerable speculation about selling some state con-
cerns to private industry, although by early 1981 there was little 
evidence of action taken in this respect. On the contrary, there 
was further expansion of state enterprises during 1979-1980. 
(Cunningham 1981a). However, some deep cuts have been announced 
in planned direct investments by state companies, and in public 
sector imports. 
(iii) The increasing internationalisation of the economic base 
Two interlinked components are briefly examined here: the growth 
in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); and the increasing importance 
of international financial and technological inputs. 
Historically, FDI has had a significant part to play in Brazilian 
economic development (Graham, 1968), but the past thirty years 
have seen an unprecedented growth of FDI (Schliemann 1979). As 
a result, large numbers of subsidiaries of Multinational Corpora-
tions (MNCs) have been established, especially in manufacturing. 
MNCs are now evident across the \vhole range of industry, but in 
particular they dominate most of the dynamic industries (with the 
main exceptions being the largely state-run steel and petroleum 
refining sectors) which successive governments have sought to 
promote. United States MNCs have predominated throughout the 
1950-1980 period, although the 1960s and 1970s witnessed increasing 
diversification in the pattern of source countries. The actual 
extent of foreign ownership in industry has been variously esti-
mated, but the overall figure seems to be in the region of 30% 
(for details of foreign ownership, see: Connor 1977; Evans 1971; 
Newfarmer 1977; Newfarmer and Mueller 1975; Tyler 1975; 
Von Doellinger and Cavalcanti 1975). 
Foreign inflows have fluctuated over the period of study. 
They began to be substantial from the mid-1950s, induced by a 
combination of high tariffs on imported manufactures and special 
concessions on imports of capital equipment which were offered to 
ventures in preferred new industries (Gordon and Grommers 1962; 
Bergsmanl970). Liberal profit remittance laws until 1962, when 
restrictions were briefly introduced under Goulart, provided a 
further stimulus. The unstable political and economic climate 
of the early 1960s and the less-welcoming approach to foreign 
investment adopted by government reduced the level of foreign 
inflows. Underthe new military government after 1964, however, 
foreign concerns were offered fresh incentives to establish new 
plants in Brazil, or to expand existing installations there. 
By the later 1960s, the restoration of international business 
confidence was reflected in large amounts of new foreign in-
vestment. Excluding reinvestments and profit remission deductions, 
such investment totalled over US$200 million in 1969, while during 
the height of the 'economic miracle' in 1973, they rose to over 
US$1,000 million. Interestingly, in spite of the economic re-
cession since 1974, Banco Central data show that FDI has remained 
high; indeed, it was well above the 1973 level in each year until 
1979.H Ultimately, control of foreign capital invested in Brazil 
is exercised from abroad. Partly to counteract this, policy 
measures have been introduced to foster association between 
foreign concerns and Brazilian public or private interests in joint 
ventures (Evans 1977, 1979). 
Other external aspects 
Foreign loans and credit to Brazil were relatively limited until 
about 1960, when the Alliance for Progress was initiated by the 
United States (Robock 1975). According to unpublished evidence 
also cited by Robock (1975, p.69), from 1949-1973 lending to Brazil 
through US AID, the IDB and IBRD totalled US$4.3 billion, with 
more than half of this being committed in the 1968-1973 period. 
Apart from the US, which remains the largest single source of 
external financing, from 1966 loans and credit to Brazil from 
other parts of the international financial world also expanded 
(Carvalho Pereira 1974). Notably, loans have been required to 
finance large-scale industrial and energy projects, and public 
sector expansion of the steel and petrochemicals industry have 
exerted particular demands in this respect. Since 1974, external 
resources have become even more crucial in attempts to offset the 
rising cost of oil imports (in 1979 oil accounted for more than a 
third of the total import bill: US$6.2 billion out of 17.9 
billion). However, the contracting of ever larger loans in recent 
years has led to the build-up of a very large gross external debt 
(standing at about US$52 billion at end June 1980), thus causing 
a heavy burden of debt service repayments (these totalled US$10.3 
billion in 1979, and estimates for 1980 are put at US$12.7 billion). 
Accompanying the internationalisation of the economic base, 
the increased use of advanced technology has been evident. The 
acceleration of these inputs can be traced to the rapid expansion 
of MNCs in the later 1950s and then from the mid-1960s. While 
constraints of time and space do not permit discussion of this 
aspect, it can be mentioned that high technology has had a marked 
effect on the country's need to finance imports of capital goods 
(Erber et al. 1974). At the same time, there have been repercus-
sions within the Brazilian capital goods industry itself, as well 
as a broader impact upon domestic industry as a whole. Notably, 
pressure for the modernisation and restructuring of firms in 
traditional industries has been considerable. Additionally, in 
their attempt to acquire the latest trapping of technological 
innovation, Brazilian private concerns have had to divert in-
creasing sums into payments for technical assistance and technology 
transfer contracts (Biato et al. 1973; Bonelli 1976). 
(iv) Efforts to strengthen Brazilian private industry 
It has been suggested above that Brazil's industrial strategy has 
meant a subsidiary role for local private concerns. This, and 
related issues arising from increasing state control of the 
economy (estatizacao) and multinational penetration, have aroused 
much criticism both from leading industrial organisations and 
individuals. A central argument has been that locally-owned 
private firms should be accorded a larger part in industrial 
development, and in particular, that measures should be taken to 
ensure the availability of financial and technical resources to 
them. 
However, it is possible to argue that private Brazilian 
firms have benefited from a variety of new elements in the 
industrial system. These include: the general expansion of the 
industrial base (especially the supply of energy and raw material 
inputs); larger funds (public and private) available to industry; 
the retention of protective legislation; the introduction of 
further policies designed to increase the domestic component in 
industrial products and to speed technology transfer; and the re-
duction of risk through association with public enterprises and 
foreign firms in joint ventures. Having said this, it needs to 
be recognised that Brazilian private industry is not homogeneous, 
being largely composed of small and medium enterprises, many of 
them individually owned and typically operating in traditional 
consumer non-durable sectors (Barros and Modenisi 1973; Rattner 
1979). These concerns can be contrasted with the larger-scale 
domestic enterprises, organised along corporate lines; often, 
these firms have substantial ranging in the dynamic-sector 
industries, as well as strong representation in traditional pre-
serves like textiles, foodstuffs and furniture (Queiroz 1965; 
Michin 1973). 
During the 1950-1980 period, the articulation of the case 
for strengthening Brazilian private enterprise has gathered 
momentum, and some steps have been taken to this end at govern-
ment policy level. While limited efforts were apparent in the 
1950s, during the course of the 1960s and 1970s the strengthening 
of this sector became a priority in BNDE policies. In 1964 
FINAME was set up by the bank as a new source of long-term and 
special financing for Brazilian companies.H Other programmes 
have aimed at improving the organisational structure of private 
domestic firms, both in the large and medium-small sized 
categories. Since 1972 a BNDE agency, CEBRAE, has been developing 
a specific role concerning the use of management techniques in 
smaller enterprises. Also, in 1974 three specialised financing 
subsidiaries of the BNDE were created: Embramec, Fibase and 
Ibrasa. Embramec (Empresa Mecanica Brasileira) was set up to 
stimulate the production of high technology equipment and capital 
goods. Its board of directors includes several leading private 
industrialists, among them Paulo Villares (of the Villares group), 
Giordano Romi (of Industrias Romi) and Claudio Bardella (of the 
Bardella group), as well as representatives from the major public 
concerns. Fibase (Financiamento de Insumos Basicos) devises 
projects in priority sectors and finances production of basic 
industrial inputs. It participates with private firms in the 
production of raw materials and intermediate products, notably 
in the chemicals, plastics, fertilisers, non-ferrous metals and 
pulp and paper industries. Finally, Ibrasa (Investimentos 
Brasileiros) is an investment company in which BNDE is the main 
shareholder supported by up to 40% of private national capital. 
State companies are excluded from these funds which are channelled 
towards small and medium enterprises in particular. The 
operations of all three subsidiaries essentially involve pur-
chasing equity in Brazilian companies, in an attempt to ensure a 
balance between foreign and local interests. 
Official policy has also attempted to eliminate risk for 
local private enterprises, by encouraging joint ventures with 
subsidiaries of state concerns (such as Petroquisa, a subsidiary 
of Petrobras, or Fibase of the BNDE) as well as with foreign 
firms. In practice, local private firms have tended to be 
minority partners in large projects, although efforts have been 
made to encourage joint ventures in which local firms are the 
majority partners. This is especially apparent in newer fields 
such as the electronics industry. In September 1974 two Brazilian 
firms - Digibras and Equipamentos Eletronicos - entered into a 
joint venture with Ferranti (UK) to form a new national computer 
equipment company, Cobra. 
Some additional examples of developments which have been 
favourably disposed to private Brazilian firms include: preferen-
tial selection of domestic firms to supply components for some 
industries (as with, for example, the choice of three electronics 
firms in December 1977 to supply the Brazilian mini-computer 
industry); positive discrimination in favour of domestically-
produced equipment when calculating incentives and/or approving 
projects submitted to the Industrial Development Council (CDI); 
and government intervention, in selected cases, to prevent domestic 
firms from being purchased by foreign concerns (for example, the 
Philips bid to take over the Consul Company in August 1975). 
Much detailed evidence on the above points remains to be 
researched. Yet, it seems that only during the past five years 
has there been any consistent exploration of problems and pos-
sibilities for local firms through the joint efforts of government 
policy makers and industrialists. As Schmitter (1971) has 
emphasised, one effect of the coup in 1964 was to reduce consul-
tation between government and other interest groups on policy 
matters. Industrial policy appears to have been no exception, 
and a long period of non-consultation persisted until about 1975-
1976. A FIESP document (FIESP 1975) may have had some influence 
in re-opening the case for the Brazilian private sector, although 
the attempts of the Geisel government to initiate dialogue (or 
distensao) on political and economic fronts was probably more 
important. 
Following high level discussions within the government 
economic council (the CDE), a document was issued in June 1976, 
advocating 'action for national private enterprise1 in its title 
(CDE 1976), and a working party was convened. The brief of the 
working party was to make 'concrete suggestions on ways of con-
solidating the position of Brazilian private enterprise.' Apart 
from government and public sector representatives, three members 
of the working party were drawn from the private sector: Octavio 
Gouveia de Bulhoes, Helio Beltrao (these first two had also held 
Cabinet posts in the military governments of Castello Branco and 
Costa e Silva respectively), and Jose Mindlin (owner of the Metal 
Leve group of industries). Between November 1976 and January 
1977 each of these three members prepared separate working papers 
in distinct spheres. Bulhoes' analysis treated monetary aspects; 
that of Beltrao was devoted to capitalisation of private enter-
prises; and Mindlin outlined a broader set of considerations cum 
policy proposals. 
It is apparent that these working papers formed the core of 
proposals contained in a document which was issued in March 1977. 
In practice, some measures had already been put into operation by 
the time the document appeared; such measures included a new 
Corporation Law and a line of credit (PROCAP) worth Cr$2 billion 
for capitalisation of Brazilian private firms. Other priority 
proposals set out in the document, concerned: the need to 
stimulate participation of local firms in new industries; the 
creation of lines of credit for capitalisation and to reduce the 
financial burden; adjustment of price controls; and revision 
of schemes for savings inputs. Most of these requirements 
appear to have been met in principle, by a series of policy 
measures which were simultaneously approved in the document. 
Among these items of legislation, CDE Resolution no. 9 can be 
singled out, in that it advocated the strengthening of local firm 
participation in capital goods, basic industries and mining. 
Despite the positive indicators, events during 1978-1980 and 
into 1981 tend to suggest that there has been only limited im-
provement in the overall conditions affecting local firms. In 
July 1978 a document was issued by a group of eight leading 
businessmen (mostly industrialists) in Sao Paulo.18 While this 
document was also more broadly involved with the current campaign 
for a return to civilian politics and democracy, there is persis-
tent criticism of the inadequate level of support to private 
local firms (especially concerning long-term capitalisation), and 
further need for greater controls to be put upon the activities 
of both foreign enterprises and the public sector. Specific 
attention is drawn to the plight of small and medium firms, and 
there is a further plea for government to invite greater active 
participation in industrial policy formation. 
The inner thoughts of domestic industry were also outlined 
in a document prepared by the Brazilian National Confederation 
of Industry (CNI) and submitted to the President-elect in January 
1979 (CNI 1979). Uniting within its organisation some 21 state-
level industrial federations and 549 affiliated unions, the CNI 
tends to be a particular spokesman for small and medium industry 
throughout Brazil. Many of the points contained in this document 
echo those already outlined above, although the question of limited 
support to small and medium firms through credit mechanisms in 
the private sector is especially emphasised. 
During 1979 and 1980 the further political opening (or 
abertura) promoted by the Figueiredo government permitted 
additional published and verbal criticism of government policy 
failures with respect to local firms. In particular, leading 
local industrialists have continued to press the case for further 
government support. An influential address on this theme was 
delivered by Paulo Villares (Executive Director of the Villares 
group of companies) to the Escola Superior de Guerra (the 
intellectual core of the military establishment) in July 1980. 
Also, in January 1981 a 'nationalist manifesto', signed by top 
industrialists, businessmen and military figures was widely 
publicised. However, prevailing economic problems and the 
introduction of further deflationary measures seem certain to 
draw government attention away from many of the important issues 
raised for some time. 
PART TWO: ANALYSIS OF BRAZILIAN PRIVATE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE, 
1950-1980. 
(i) The problem of definition and data sources 
An initial fundamental problem concerns the definition of 
Brazilian private industrial enterprise (referred to hereafter 
as EPN). At the simplest level, EPN enterprises may be defined 
as those which are wholly or dominantly owned by private residents 
of Brazil. Ideally, such firms would by 90-100% Brazilian, 
although from the discussion in part one it follows that mixed 
ownership patterns often reduce this participation. Technically, 
the definition is usually taken to include all firms where 51% or 
more of social capital is in Brazilian private hands. While 
this may appear to be straightforward, a number of problems fre-
quently defy the accurate classification of firms. In the first 
place it may be difficult to distinguish the private element, 
since there is a tendency to generalise capital ownership into the 
two categories national (nacional) and foreign (estrangeiro). 
This aspect becomes important when, in the absence of company 
breakdowns of social capital, more aggregate data have to be used. 
A more important point is that EPN ownership may be more complex 
than that of a single firm. This is especially relevant among 
the larger Brazilian corporate enterprises, where there may be a 
range of parent-subsidiary structures spread across a variety of 
industrial and other sectors (e.g. finance, commerce). Thus, 
ownership details might vary within individual components of the 
group. Further, enterprise ownership is not static, and patterns 
may change over time, so carrying intra-firm, intra-group or 
intersectoral implications. Such changes in ownership are not 
always easy to document; similarlyy the reasons for such changes 
are rarely clear. It is frequently assumed that ownership changes 
are imposed by outside interests (for example, multinationals)s 
yet, there may be important cases where EPN firms have a far from 
passive role3 perhaps striking their own bargain with the 
outsider.Finally, the ownership question is often complicated 
by issues such as company control, control of technological inputs, 
and so on. 
A further methodological question concerns firm size and 
the measure(s) used. In the various analyses presented below, a 
basic subdivision into small, medium and large firms has been 
made where necessary, based upon the employment criteria most 
frequently used in Brazil: 10-99 (small); 100-500 (medium); 
500 and over (large). 
Data sources used include a variety of unpublished docu-
ments, primary survey results, industrial directories and material 
compiled during field research in Brazil. Particular problems 
with individual sources are raised in the part of the text to 
which they relate. 
(ii) Evidence on growth and survival patterns 
There are considerable gaps in the data base necessary for a full 
systematic study of growth and survival patterns of the EPN. On 
the one hand, foundation dates are not always easy to trace, while 
on the other, detailed information about firm 'deaths' (through 
bankruptcies, mergers etc.) extending back in time for thirty 
years is even more difficult to obtain. These deficiencies, 
together with the observed tendency for internationalisation 
of industry over the period of study, partly explain why recent 
work in this field has treated one major aspect: the denational-
isation of local firms by MNCs. Even so, the range of industries 
covered by the relevant studies has been limited (see: Bertero 
1972; Evans 1971, 1979; Newfarmer 1977, 1979). Some further 
aspects of growth and survival are touched upon by Martins 1965; 
Queiroz 1965; Diniz and Boschi 1978. Perhaps the most detailed 
study to appear so far on the theme is that of Rattner et al. 
(1979), which treats small and medium enterprises. 
In the section below a variety of material is used to 
amplify existing evidence, or report findings in the case of the 
study by Rattner et al. 
Survey evidence from IUPERJ 
The author was given free access to the raw data gathered from 
industrial firms in 1976 by IUPERJ as part of a specific project 
(Diniz and Boschi 1978:a). The survey was directed at firms 
located in the metropolitan areas of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro 
and Belo Horizonte, and covered food, electrical-electronic and 
other capital goods industries. Only the latter two groups of 
industry have been used in the present analysis.21 
For the original survey, an initial listing of 5,572 firms 
and 1,353 firms in the two sectors was reduced to 434 and 487 
firms respectively, using a random number programme.22 
Questionnaires were then sent to these firms. The former group 
achieved a 20% reply rate (87 replies), and the latter a 14% 
reply rate (67 replies). From the combined total of 154 firms, 
the present author selected only those firms having over 51% 
Brazilian ownership. 135 firms were in this category, and 
although it was not possible to determine the precise extent of 
public participation for all firms, it is unlikely (from other 
evidence) that such participation was substantial. 
Since all firms in the sample were obviously survivors, 
attention was given to their formation dates as an indicator of 
growth patterns during different sub-periods. On aggregate, it 
was found that half the firms (68/135) were established in the 
post-1960 period, while almost 30% (39/135) were set up in the 
1950s. The remaining 28 firms (roughly 20%) had pre-1950 origins, 
the bulk of these being formed in the 1940s. 
A finding of particular interest was that 27 of the 68 firms 
formed since 1960 had foundation dates during the recession years 
of 1962-66 inclusive (while 34 had origins during the expansion 
years from 1968-74). This is perhaps surprising, given the 
economic recession associated with the years from 1962. Clearly, 
it would be valuable to know further details of the proportion of 
survivals to firms deaths during that period. 
When firm size is taken into consideration, it is apparent 
that the predominance of small and medium enterprises strongly 
influences the aggregate pattern. 93% of the total sample was, 
in fact, in the small and medium size range, with 70 and 56 firms 
respectively. Two-thirds of the small, and more than a third of 
medium enterprises originated in the post-1960 period, while only 
one of the nine large enterprises was established after 1960. 
These findings are summarised in Table 2 below. 
Table 2 
Foundation dates of Brazilian firms from the IUPERJ survey 
by sector and firm size 
FIRM Electrical--Electronic Other Capital Goods 
SIZE Pre- 50s Post- TOTAL Fre- 50s Post TOTAL 





lute No.) lute NoJ 
Small 20 26 54 (39) 10 16 74 (31) 
Medium 17 53 40 (30) 23 35 42 (26) 
Large 100 - - ( 2) 57 29 14 ( 7) 
71 64 
Source: Calculated from original survey data from IUPERJ survey, 
Rio de Janeiro 1976. 
In certain respects the findings raise more questions than 
they answer. Clearly, information about the proportion of sur-
vivals these firms represent would increase the explanatory power 
of the observations. Further details about the evolution of 
individual firms would also be useful. For example, a firm 
which could be classified as small at its origin in 1963, may 
have grown into the medium category by 1976. The basic trend, 
as might be anticipated from other work, is that larger firms tend 
to have been set up in earlier periods, these being only few in 
number on a contemporary basis when compared to small and medium 
firms. Conversely, small and medium firms have more recent 
origins. Yet, it is certainly significant to point out that the 
post-1950 period as a whole has witnessed the growth of EPN 
concerns in dynamic industries during the same time that public 
sector and foreign interests have forged the expansion of such 
industries. The predominance of small and medium firms in this 
process is perhaps at first surprising, given the constraints 
known to affect firms of this size. It does5 however, tie in 
with Evans1 (1979) suggestion that 
'Local capital in significant amounts has found 
its way into "modern" industries.' (Evans, 
p.120). 
It also provides a positive response to his question as to 
whether 
'...this capital has discovered, within these 
industries, sub-areas in which small-scale 
competitive production is still possible.' (ibid). 
Further questions are also raised about the relationship between 
small and medium enterprises, and large concerns, both in static 
terms and over time. 
Evidence from the study by Rattner et al. (1979) 
At this point, it is appropriate to review the main findings of 
the study by Rattner et al., which specifically treats small and 
medium firms. The recent work is, in fact, a follow-up study 
of a survey carried out in 1963, involving Brazilian private 
enterprises in the cities of Sao Paulo, Porto Alegre and Salvador. 
The recent survey was carried out in 1976 and involved 165 of 
the firms originally surveyed in 1963. 
It was found that of the original sample, while some 60% 
of firms had survived the intervening years 1963-76 (99 firms 
out of 165), far less than half the total survivors (40 out 
of 99, or 24% of the sample) had continued under identical 
ownership. Notably, a quarter of the survivors (24 out of 99) 
had admitted new partners with up to 49% of company shares. 
Interestingly, 16 of the 99 survivors had been sold to either 
foreign or national concerns (10 and 6 firms respectively). 
Also, older firms had better survival ratings. 
Of the non-survivors (66 out of 165), mortality tended to 
be greater among firms which, at the time of the initial survey 
in 1963, had not completed their first three years of life. As 
a further point, the highest survival rate was experienced in 
Porto Alegre (61%), followed by Sao Paulo (44%), while the city 
of Salvador had the lowest rate (27%). The non-survivors 
included 31 firms which were traced, and 35 firms which could 
not be traced but where all the evidence pointed to closure. 
Among the 31 closures which were fully documented, 25 took place 
between 1963 and 1969. As far as could be ascertained, com-
petition and lack of working capital appear to have been among 
the principal motives for closure, while of 31 firms affected 
there were 16 in 'dynamic' sector industries. In terms of 
firm size, almost a half of the closures were in firms employing 
less than 20 people, and, typically, partners in such firms 
tended to be composed of family members or of groups of friends 
and acquaintances. 
This brief review cannot do justice to the full published 
study, but it does indicate the degree to which small and 
medium firms can undergo rapid change over relatively short periods 
of time. 
Aspects of firm survival indicated by bankruptcy patterns 
Insolvency, judicially declared, gives rise to the legal process 
of liquidation. Thus, some general patterns of firm survival can 
be inferred from a study of Brazilian firms that have failed 
owing to bankruptcy. Unfortunately, past data unearthed to date 
does not permit analysis on a detailed level, and temporal and 
spatial coverage tends to be limited. 
For the following analysis annual insolvency data were 
available for both Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro over the period 
1953-67 inclusive. From 1967-78 (inclusive) annual data were 
obtained for Sao Paulo only, although this material provided much 
more information (from 1969 onwards) about the types of industry 
affected. It should be pointed out that in Brazilian law, bank-
ruptcy proceedings can take two main forms: voluntary (involving 
the Concordata) and involuntary (termed Falencia). Only involun-
tary insolvency data were used. Such data as are available 
reflect stages in the legal process by which firms are liquidated. 
Two main variables are of relevance here: requests for liquida-
tion (Requerimentos) and decreed liquidation (Decretos). The 
former represents the initial stage of the process during which 
one or more concerns may file requests against an enterprise 
which is failing to meet its commitments (the number of requests 
may thus often exceed the actual number of firms involved, and 
this needs to be borne in mind when using the data). It may 
be the case that numbers of requests are a more accurate reflec-
tion of the economic climate at a given time, than the decreed 
insolvency pattern, since decrees represent a later stage of the 
liquidation process and are far more likely to reflect the pace 
of the legal system. 
As a general point, it can be mentioned that the types of 
firm most susceptible to failure are Limited Companies (Sociedades 
de Responsabilidade Limitada) and those firms which are individually 
owned (Firmas Individuals). According to the 1970 Industrial 
Census, these two ownership types accounted for 32% and 56% 
respectively of total firms in Brazil, although together they only 
accounted for 25% of the value of industrial production. By 
implication, these firms comprise the small and medium enterprises 
which are predominantly owned by the Brazilian private sector. 
Conversely,it is apparent that Corporations (the Sociedades Ano-
nimas,or S.A.) - which include large private Brazilian firms, 
public enterprises and foreign concerns - rarely fail. 
Table 3 below shows annual totals for insolvencies in Rio de 
Janeiro and Sao Paulo over the period 1953-67.While with 
data of this kind care must be taken in interpreting economic 
trends, attention can be drawn to the distinct upswing in insol-
vency requests during two sub-periods: 1956-59 and 1965-67. 
Table 3 
Annual insolvency totals in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, 1953-67 
REQUESTS DECREES 
YEAR RIO S.P. RIO S.P. 
1953 154 430 88 157 
1954 157 444 73 101 
1955 171 444 91 112 
1956 200 641 85 139 
1957 176 770 82 174 
1958 221 824 76 165 
1959 375 681 133 183 
1960 222 544 87 145 
1961 214 427 67 154 
1962 217 512 86 89 
1963 138 421 34 69 
1964 168 588 47 93 
1965 179 958 42 105 
1966 299 1,313 51 91 
1967 428 1,865 80 95 
Source: Boletim da Associagao Comercial de Sao Paulo (Instituto de 
Economia Gastao Vidigal) Sao Paulo, each year from 1968. 
Notes: Annual data are JanrDec.inclusive; the discrepancy between 
the 1967 requests total shown in this Table and that shown 
Table 3 is explained by the fact that the Table 3 data are 
for numbers of firms affected by requests, 
n.a.-data not available. 
REQUESTS DECREES 
YEAR TOTAL No. OF FIRMS IND FIRMS TOTAL IND FIRMS 
1967 3,689 n.a. n.a. 494 n.a. 
1968 3,538 ii II 619 II 
1969 4,551 ii 595 896 II 
1970 4,331 it 701 969 207 
1971 3,871 2,776 631 701 160 
1972 4,777 3,248 843 945 233 
1973 5,750 3,654 798 1,098 238 
1974 3,174 2,285 481 671 135 
1975 3,518 2,504 698 662 130 
1976 3,752 2,707 770 744 190 
1977 5,554 3,714 1,163 835 223 
1978 8,089 4,893 1,335 1,031 259 
Source: Conjuntura Economica, Rio de Janeiro (various issues). 
Note: Annual data cover slightly different periods: 1953-55 
JanrOct;; 1956-62 JanrNov; 1963-67 Janr0ct. (all periods 
inclusive). 
Table 4 
Annual insolvency totals in Sao Paulo, 1967-78 
The latter falls within the period of economic recession which 
began in 1962. It also coincides with the initial period of 
policy construction under the first military government headed 
by Castello Branco, and during which Roberto Campos as Planning 
Minister was able to implement a range of monetarist measures. 
It may well be that the 'credit squeeze1 which was one immediate 
outcome of these measures was a decisive factor affecting firm 
survival in this period. The peak in insolvencies indicated 
between 1956-59 is clearly of a lesser scale than that in the 
mid-1960s. It also occurred within the period of economic 
expansion generated during the Presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek. 
An important observation about the nature of growth which charac-
terised the Kubitschek years is that it was associated with in-
creasing inflation. In a discussion of economic trends from 
the mid-1950s Bergsman (1970) states: 
'Both the inflation and the growth, which occurred 
simultaneously until 1963, can be seen as results 
of a more-or-less common set of policies - some of 
the policies that spurred the growth also spurred the 
inflation.' 
Although it is true that inflation was still at a fairly moderate 
level in the second half of the 1950s, averaging 20% p.a. during 
the four years from 1956-59, by the end of Kubitschek's term 
the annual average was almost 30%. One impact of these (and 
other) trends upon industry seems to have been an increase in the 
problem of financing working capital requirements (cf. Bergsman, 
p.62). If this was so, it seems likely that the rise in insol-
vencies from 1956-59 is a reflection of problems generated by 
rapidly changing economic conditions, in spite of the fact that 
the direction of overall growth was positive. 
Two further peaks in the level of insolvency requests can be 
identified from Table 4, which has figures for Sao Paulo only, 
from 1967-78. The relevant years are 1972-73 and 1977-78. 
The former sub-period falls within the height of the 'economic 
miracle' phase, while the latter is part of the recession stage 
evident from the mid-1970s. Given the lack of perspective on 
these very recent events - although the causes of insolvencies 
in the current phase seem obvious enough - discussion will be 
confined to an interpretation based upon the resulting patterns 
in industry alone. 
A rare opportunity to examine the types of industries affected 
by bankruptcy proceedings in the capital of Sao Paulo between 
1969 and l978 is provided by data contained in the annual reports 
of the Sao Paulo Commercial A s s o c i a t i o n . ^ Tables 5(a) and 
5(b) show the appropriate details. 
As a general point, it can be seen that during the ten-year 
period a total of 8,015 industrial firms were affected by in-
voluntary legal proceedings leading to liquidation, while from 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The data oil insolvency requests show that virtually a fifth of 
total firms affected were in metallurgy. This industry, while 
it is generally treated with others of the 'dynamic' group, has 
a long-standing importance also as a traditional industry in 
Sao Paulo. In 1970, Census data for the municipio of Sao Paulo 
indicate that 10% of all industrial firms were in metallurgy 
(2,501 out of 20,543 establishments). Interestingly, insolvency 
data for the same year show that some 129 firms were affected in 
the industry. This corresponds to 5% of the total in metallurgy, 
and may give an indication of the likely turnover rate. 
Other large casualties can be observed in: printing and 
publishing (850); food (761); furniture (707); plastics and 
rubber (556); machinery (532); and textiles (486). If 
metallurgy is excluded from the dynamic group, it is apparent 
that these industries have been less affected by insolvency than 
the traditional group, with 23.5% and 44.2% of insolvencies 
respectively. 
Returning to the peaks in insolvency requests in 1972-73 and 
1977-78, several observations can be made. In 1972 and 1973 it 
appears that, in addition to the usual high level of insolvencies 
in metallurgy, levels were exceptionally high among food and 
printing and publishing firms. Larger than usual totals were 
al so seen in machinery, wood and furniture and plastics. By 
contrast, the pattern in 1977-78 reveals an above average number 
of requests in all industries except food, with exceptionally high 
levels in metallurgy, machinery, chemicals, plastics, textiles, 
clothing, and printing and publishing. The findings for 1977-78 
raise important questions about the real impact of the current 
recession on Brazilian industrial firms, especially since the 
dynamic group of industries appears to have been affected more 
adversely than its previous record. 
As a final point, it is emphasised that while the evidence 
gleaned from the study of bankruptcy patterns may be lacking in 
detail and explanatory power, the findings leave no doubt that 
insolvency has been a considerable and continuous problem for 
Brazilian industry, not least in the country's industrial hub: 
Sao Paulo. 
(iii) Evidence from a locational study of the largest 
enterprises 
Aspects of industrial location in Brazil have been treated at 
some length by the present author (Cunningham 1974, 1979). Major 
work in this field includes: Taylor 1962; Geiger 1963; Rattner 
1972; Haddad 1975; and Dickenson 1978. In this section atten-
tion is devoted to one specific aspect: the location of large 
enterprises in the capital goods and chemical sectors. In 
particular, locational patterns observed for large private domestic 
firms are compared with patterns for multinational enterprises 
in the same industries. Enterprises from five dynamic-sector 
industries which have undergone rapid growth since 1950 were 
selected for analysis from a basic listing in the 1979 Visao survey 
Quem e Quem. The five industries are as follows: metal fabri-
cation; machinery (including motors and industrial equipment); 
electrical, electronic and communications equipment; transport 
equipment (including naval, railway, air, automotive components 
and agricultural equipment); and chemicals (including plastics 
and pharmaceuticals). Actual enterprises used in the analysis 
were Brazilian private enterprises belonging to essentially 
corporate groups (these being perhaps the nearest domestic 
equivalents to MNCs), and enterprises classified as MNCs by 
Visao.26 In all, a total of 214 private Brazilian (group) 
enterprises and 284 MNCs (out of 566 MNCs covered by the entire 
Visao survey) were studied. Additionally, given the importance 
of public enterprise in the petrochemical sector (through Petro-
bras and its subsidiaries), 24 public firms were included in that 
part of the analysis. Table 6 summarises the numbers of enter-
prises studied in each industry and shows the actual total of 
enterprises in each sector listed by Visao. It is emphasised, 
however, that the enterprises studied correspond to all those 
classified as the Brazilian private group enterprises and multi-
nationals in each sector. The remaining enterprises (not studied 
here) were thus predominantly firms under private Brazilian indi-
vidual ownership with a relatively small number of public enter-
prises . 
Table 6 
Numbers of enterprises used in the locational analysis 
SECTORS No. OF ENTERPRISES STUDIED 
ALL ENTERPRISES IN 
SECTOR (VISAO) 
EPN MNC 
Metal fabrication 62 46 370 
Machinery 31 71 292 
Electrical 22 41 139 
Transport 36 35 171 
SUBTOTAL 151 193 972 
Chemicals etc. 63 91 361 
TOTAL 214 284 1,333 
Source: Visao - Quem e Quem na Economia Brasileira (Sao Paulo, 
1979). 
Location of enterprises in metal fabrication, machinery, 
electrical and transport equipment industries 
It can be seen from Table 6 that MNC enterprises accounted for only 
a fifth of total enterprises covered by the Visao survey. Bra-
zilian private enterprises are thus predominant in numbers, with 
the 'group1 concerns (151 shown in Table), accounting for 15% 
of the total, and firms under individual ownership (616 firms not 
shown above) comprising virtually two-thirds of the total. However9 
the numerical predominance of Brazilian concerns is strongly coun-
tered by the much larger scale operations of MNCs. While 
accounting for only a fifth of enterprises, MNC asset shares were 
over 40% of the total for the four sectors combined. In the 
electrical and transport sectors, where the share of firms was 
30% and 20% respectively, asset shares rose to 51% and 56%.27 
The results of a comparative analysis of MNC and Brazilian 
private (group) enterprises at plant level are summarised in 
Table 7. Actual locations have not been mapped, but Figure 1 
shows the regional and state divisions of Brazil and the relative 
location of the principal industrial zones within the country's 
major industrial triangle which will be referred to in the text. 
Perhaps, predictably, in the light of the brief discussion 
about locational patterns in part one, the general finding was 
that locations within the municipio of Sao Paulo and the rest of 
the Sao Paulo metropolitan area were the most important elements 
of a distribution pattern heavily skewed towards the state of 
Sao Paulo. Yet, there was a consistent tendency for a larger 
proportion of the Brazilian private concerns to be located in 
parts of the country other than Sao Paulo state. By contrast, 
of the four sectors studied, only in the electrical industry did 
MNC locations outside Sao Paulo state account for more than a 
third of the total. The wider distribution of electrical firms 
can be accounted for by past takeovers of domestic concerns 
(cf. Newfarmer 1977) and by the fact that a significant number of 
MNC subsidiaries have been set up to take advantage of regional 
fiscal incentives in the Northeast, and to a lesser extent, the 
Manaus Free Zone. Where MNC plants were located elsewhere than 
Sao Paulo state, with the exception of the electrical industry, 
the receiving states were almost entirely confined to Rio de 
Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul and Bahia. In the case 
of the Brazilian private enterprises (EPN), the list of states 
included the above plus Santa Catarina, Pernambuco, Amazonia 
and several Northeast states. 
It is worth emphasising one aspect brought out by the break-
down of intra-metropolitan Sao Paulo locations (partially shown 
in the Table). The municipio of Sao Paulo itself accounted for 
over half the MNC enterprises in all sectors except transport, 
where plants were predominantly located in the so-called 'ABC' 
municipios adjacent to Sao Paulo itself (Santo Andre, Sao Bernardo 
do Campo, and Sao Caetano do Sul). As is well known, from the 
mid-1950s, land in these districts was increasingly given over to 
MNC car plants. By contrast, the domestic enterprises
Fig. 1 
Fig. 2 
transport are divided almost equally between Sao Paulo itself 
and the rest of the metropolitan area. This pattern can be 
explained partly as a reflection of the historical development 
of the industry} whereby local firms produced transport goods, 
including components for imported vehicles - many firms thus 
being located in the city of Sao Paulo before the arrival of MNCs 
- a fact that the contemporary role of local firms is now largely 
given over to the manufacture of components to supply MNCs. 
Brief mention can be made of a separate analysis of head-
quarters locations (in so far as it is possible to refer to 
headquarters of MNC subsidiaries) for which data are not shown. 
The city of Sao Paulo was the main HQ for the EPN (group) 
enterprises and the local headquarters for MNC enterprises, although 
a larger proportion of MNCs located there than did EPN concerns. 
This was matched by a more pronounced separation of administrative 
and productive plant locations in the case of MNCs. In less than 
a fifth of the MNCs studied was the HQ in the same location as 
the factory. This compares with 40-50% for the large Brazilian 
enterprises. These findings are consistent with the general 
characteristics expected of MNCs from the literature (cf. Kindle-
berger 1970). 
Location of enterprises in the chemicals industries 
The number of enterprises by ownership category is shown in Table 8. 
This Table includes all enterprises listed by Visao, although 
for analytical purposes only the 91 MNC and 63 EPN (group) 
enterprises were used. 
Mention has been made elsewhere of the central role of the 
state-owned company Petrobras in the industry - particularly in 
oil refining and the production of basic chemicals. The 24 
public enterprises shown above (mostly under the aegis of Petro-
quisa, the subsidiary set up in 1967 to enable joint ventures to 
take place between the public sector and private concerns) actually 
control a third of assets among all enterprises listed in this 
sector by Visao. This concentration of assets was even higher 
than in the case of MNCs, which with 56 enterprises had almost a 
third of assets also. Additionally, attention should be drawn 
to the overriding importance of imported petroleum in providing 
one of the largest inputs for Brazil's 'modern' chemical industry, 
which has undergone extremely rapid expansion in recent years. 
Oil imports largely explain the mainly coastal or near-coastal 
locations of the mainPetrcbras refineries shown in Figure 2. In 
turn, these refineries have provided a focus for both private 
plants (MNC and EPN) and joint ventures of Petroquisa, although 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Numbers of enterprises and ownership structure of the 
chemicals sector, 1979 








Chemical/Petrocnem. 21 56 41 101 219 













Source: Quern e Quern na Economia Brasileira, Visao, Sao Paulo, 1979. 
Notes: PUBLIC Public Sector (or State) enterprises; EG abbrevia-
ted from the Portuguese Empresas do Governo; MNC Multi-
nationals; EPN Brazilian Private Enterprises abbreviated 
from the Portuguese Empresa Privada Nacional. 
Only the EPN (Group) enterprises were used in the analysis 
of Brazilian private concerns. 
Table 9 summarises the locational characteristics of the 
firms studied, at plant level. Differences in patterns between 
MNCs and the Brazilian concerns are remarkably clear. Out of an 
actual total of 103 MNC plants, only 14 were found elsewhere than 
the states of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro (although 18 plant 
locations were not traced). In fact, over a third of all plants 
belonging to MNCs were located in the municipio of Sao Paulo alone, 
with a seventh in the fABC' districts (especially Sao Bernardo do 
Campo). In all, the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo had over half 
the total MNC plants. For the Brazilian (EPN) concerns, the 
location pattern was almost the opposite of that for MNCs. More 
than 40% of all plants were located outside Sao Paulo - Rio, the 
majority of these being in the Northeast region, with large numbers 
also in the South. Less than a quarter of plants were in the 
municipio of Sao Paulo and the combined proportion of plants in 
the metropolitan area was only about a third of the total. 
To some extent, the analysis under-represents the importance 
of MNCs in a variety of joint ventures with Petroquisa (and other 
public sector concerns), many of which are located in states other 
than Sao Paulo - Rio, and especially in Minas Gerais, Bahia, 
Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul. These concerns would not show 
in the Visao classification as MNCs, since in most of these 
cases the public sector controls the majority share of capital. 
Viewing the locational evidence above as a whole, it is ap-
parent that there is a good deal of scope for more detailed study 
in this sphere. In particular, it would be valuable to extend 
the analysis to the individual enterprises which are so numerous 
in the enterprise structure. Moreover, there is an urgent need 
to examine aspects of inter-firm linkages and intra-firm structure 
within a locational framework. Having said this, attention can 
be drawn to one clear finding. This concerns the much more marked 
locational concentration of MNC subsidiaries (especially in the 
Southeast region, and specifically the metropolitan area and state 
of Sao Paulo) as compared with subsidiaries of large private 
Brazilian firms. At the regional level, this finding suggests 
that fiscal incentives offered to MNCs to locate in less pros-
perous regions such as the Northeast, have not yet proved 
sufficiently attractive alternatives to profit-maximising activities 
in mainly metropolitan locations such as those of Sao Paulo and Rio. 
At the metropolitan scale, this preference of MNCs is consistent 
with the observations of Connor (1977) concerning the tendency for 
MNC affiliates to locate in competition with other MNCs, and the 
market power of such enterprises. 
Table 9 
Location of Multinational and Brazilian private (group) 
enterprises in the chemical industry, 1979.* 
LOCATION No. of Plants 
MNC EPN 
Sao Paulo Municipio 34 8 
Rest of Metropolitan Area 22 7 
M.A.S.P. Subtotal (56) (15) 
Other Sao Paulo State 9 7 
Total Sao Paulo State (a) 65 22 
Other parts of Brazil (b) 
Rio de Janeiro State 9 2 
South Brazil 1 11 
Northeast Brazil 6 15 
Other 4 2 
TOTAL (a) plus (b) 85 52 
Plant Locations Unknown 18 16 
Actual No. Enterprises 91 63 
Visao, Sao Paulo, 1979; Plant locations for these enter-
prises from Anuario das Industrias, FIESP, Sao Paulo, 1979. 
Notes: See Notes to Table 8, 
* Includes Plastics and Pharmaceuticals. 
(iv) Case Studies of firms in capital goods industries 
The case studies presented below allow a closer look at the com-
plexity of ownership and production relationships, and permit a 
glimpse into some financial and technological aspects of private 
Brazilian enterprises. While coverage is limited to larger firms 
in the capital goods industry - broadly defined to include machin-
ery, electrical goods, automotive components, etc. - it is intended 
that these studies will give further perspective to issues raised 
elsewhere in the paper, especially contemporary problems affecting 
domestic concerns. 
Table 10 summarises the basic characteristics of the nine 
firms studied. For reasons of confidentiality, the names of 
the Brazilian firms are not disclosed, although those of public 
agencies and foreign concerns associated with them are stated where 
known. From the Table, it can be seen that the dominant fields of 
manufacturing output were components for the automotive industry 
(mainly vehicles), electrical products and machinery, the number 
of firms in each being five, two and two respectively. The 
foundation dates,without exception, bear out earlier observations 
about the tendency for larger enterprises to have been in 
existence for longer periods of time than smaller concerns. The 
importance of the 1950s is clear given that five firms and one 
subsidiary had origins in that decade; the remaining firms were 
set up in the previous two decades - two in the 1940s and two in 
the 1930s - although three subsidiaries were created in the 
1970s. Ownership details show the range of combinations that 
one might expect in firms which almost certainly originated as 
100% Brazilian (private). From available evidence only one firm 
of the nine appeared to be in this category at the end of 1979. 
The remainder had varying amounts of foreign participation, with 
US multinationals being most numerous (four firms) and Japanese, 
Swiss and UK MNCs having a stake in one firm each. Several 
firms also had additional participation in share capital by 
BNDE or its subsidiaries (Embramec, Ibrasa) while all firms had 
received project financing or loans through the bank. Finally, 
with respect to location, although there is a marked bias towards 
the state of Sao Paulo, three out of eight plants were in interior 
- as opposed to metropolitan - Sao Paulo, with one of the metro-
politan firms having established a new plant in Minas Gerais 
state. The two remaining firms were located in the states of Rio 
de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul respectively, with the latter 
having subsidiary plants in the Northeast (Recife) and Amazonia 
(Manaus). 
It is emphasised that information used in the compilation of 
the case studies was not of uniform quality, nor did it always 
cover the same range of aspects in equivalent detail. 
Notes (Table 10): Ownership details circa 1978/79 or latest 
available; National share includes any public 
participation - shown in far right-hand column 
where known. 
Foundation dates in parentheses refer to sub-
sidiaries created in same or similar field. 
Several firms had one or more subsidiaries in 
different economic activities; ownership details 
shown here refer only to the main company in the 
manufacturing sphere indicated; where relevant, 
subsidiaries in the same area of manufacturing 
are indicated both in the Table and the individual 
case studies. 
No 3: Location may include Sorocaba in addition 
to Sao Bernardo. 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Two plants in Maua and one in Santo Andre (both 
in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area). 
One in which the company has a 99% interest related 
to the auto-parts field; one in which it has a 95% 
stake - a shock absorber plant newly set up in Belo 
Horizonte (see Table); two in the agricultural 
field (both 50% interests) and one in elastomeric 
fibres (50%). 
95.4% national; BNDE appears to have held about 
25% of social capital since May 1976; the foreign 
component (4.5%) is held by Monroe (US). 
BNDE financing: This company was one of the first to gain financing 
under FIPEME (a programme of the bank introduced in 
1965 for small and medium firm financing), for 
expansion of its shock absorber factory (one of the 
original ones in Maua) and for the production of 
piston rings. 
Products and markets 
(i) Shock absorbers: The company practically has a monopoly in 
supplying the Brazilian auto industry (in 1977, the company 
supplied 6.1 million of 7.2 million units) and this item 
accounted for 33% of sales in 1977. 
(ii) Piston rings: The company supplies a large part of the market 
for piston rings in the auto industry; for example, in 1975 
it supplied 20% of demand of Volkswagen; 50% Skania-Saab; 
50% Ford Tratores; 20% Peugeot; and two and a half million 
units to Motores Perkins; these accounted for 28% of sales 
(1977). 
(iii) Engine blocks/heads: also account for 28% of sales (1977); 
two-thirds of output goes direct to car manufacturers, a 
quarter to distributors of parts. 
Sales in general: In 1977 Volkswagen accounted for 22% of sales, 
followed by General Motors (12.7%); Scania (8%); Ford (6%); 
overall, eight companies took 70% of sales; only about 6% 
of output is exported. 
Technology 
The company has pursued an aggressive policy of technological 
development, and has a relatively high degree of sophistication in 
technology and marketing strategies; it has its own research/tech-
nical centre; there is strong evidence of several technical 





Power Corporation (US) for motor components; and Boge Gmbh (WG) 
for a line of shock absorbers. 
Backgrounds of main company executives 
The current President first went to work as Director of a family 
firm which imported auto-components back in 1940; in 1951, the 
firm was sold, and the present company was founded; the Vice-
President is an engineer, who held apprenticeships in the US 
(Monroe, TRW Gemmer, Ford, General Motors, Carnegie), West Germany 
(Boge, Volkswagen), Sweden (Saab-Ccania) and UK (Leyland, Rover); 
it is interesting to note the extent to which the current links 
of the company reflect the experience and contact of the company 
Vice-President. 
Problems 
The company has been adversely affected by the crisis in the car 
industry from about 1975; especially notable was excess capacity 
although from mid-1979 there was apparently some improvement over 
1978. 
1951 
Sao Bernardo do Campo, Sao Paulo. 
This company is but one of a large Brazilian 
group of enterprises operating in the field of 
steel production and heavy equipment manufacture; 
the ownership details relate only to the company 
in the case study: national 61.7%, foreign 38.3% 
(US Dana Corp.), the foreign partner having 
entered in 1974. 
The company produces components destined for the 
Brazilian car industry, and also products derived 
from iron-founding, including axles, etc. 
A large-scale expansion project was proposed in 
1974, at a time when the Brazilian transport sector 
was beginning to face new problems; this was given 
financial support by BNDE, although the project had 
not been completed by early 1978. 
The company signed some of the earliest licensing 
and technical assistance contracts during the phase 
when the automobile industry was being set up in 
the 1950s, in particular with Hastings manufacturing 
Co. (US) and Goetzewerke Friedrich Goetre AG (WG) 
for piston rings (founding and moulding processes); 
in 1972 it began a series of contacts with the 
Sealed Power Corp. (US) with a view to establishing 
technical assistance programmes, but this does not 
appear to have materialised, and in 1974 new nego-
tiations with Dana Corp. (US) finally produced a 
contract for technology transfer through Dana's 
'Perfect Circle' division; at the same time Dana 
gained a stake in the company of almost 40%. 
The company appears to have encountered substantial 
technological development problems, and also had 
failed (by the mid-1970s) to renew much of its 
existing machinery and equipment; it could be 
inferred that the current economic recession is 
aggravating these problems. 
Foundation: 1953 
Location: Sao Bernardo do Campo (metropolitan area of Sao 
Paulo) and Sorocaba. 
Ownership: 66.7% national (including some shares held by 
IBRASA) and 33.3% foreign, held by SPS Co. 
(Jenkinstown, Pennsylvania US); negotiations 
with SPS apparently began as far back as 1959, but 
were only brought to fruition in 1966. 
Company growth: The company had small beginnings, originally as a 
machinery shop; later began to specialise in 
screws and related products such as Allen-type 
keys and other small components. 
Financing: The company has had support from both the BNDE and 
the Industrial Development Council (CDI) over a 
number of years, dating back to the implantation 
of the automobile industry in the mid-1950s. 
Sales: 85-90% of all sales are in Sao Paulo, over half of 
sales going direct to the car industry. 
Raw materials: Steel is the basic input and accounts for about 
45% of production costs; stocks of steel are thus 
needed to help offset price rises, especially since 
75-80% of the steel used is imported with the re-
mainder being supplied from within Brazil. 
Technology: Until 1969 SPS supplied technology and equipment 
from North America but apparently in 1969 SPS 
wanted to increase its stake in the company to a 
majority shareholding, and brought a certain amount 
of pressure to bear concerning increases in royalty 
payments; these events came to a head in 1974 when 
the Brazilian company approached IBRASA to take a 
shareholding in the concern; IBRASA did enter 
taking on mainly Preference shares. 
Other problems: In 1973, the company needed a new factory site, to 
expand production and acquire a better-organised 
plant; ideally, it wanted a site in the ABC area 
of Sao Paulo, in order to maintain easy sales links 
and to keep costs of transporting steel down; 
however, sites in the desired districts proved too 
costly, so the company reputedly selected a new plant 
site in Sorocaba (to the NW of Sao Paulo) taking 
advantage of incentives being offered with the 
setting up of a new industrial zone (or estate) 
there; it is not clear whether this plant is in 
operation and/or if it involved total relocation. 
Foundation: 1941 
Location: Interlagos (part of Sao Paulo Municipio) and 
Socorro, Santo Amaro (also part of Sao Paulo). 
Subsidiaries: In 1956 the company established a carburettor 
division which eventually became the main source 
of income, but which was sold to a foreign concern 
in 1978/79 (for which see details below) ; a 
further subsidiary in a similar field (oil and 
petrol pumps) was set up in 1973 in conjunction 
with a US firm; a financing subsidiary was esta-
blished in 1963. 
Ownership: As will be appreciated from the above (and what 
follows below) the company has been affected by a 
series of ownership changes in recent years, one of 
which resulted in the denationalisation of the firm's 
main product division (carburettors); the original 
private Brazilian family controlled almost two-
thirds of social capital in the company (about 63%) 
which was almost totally nationally-owned, until 
1976: in 1976, the capital structure of the company 
was completely reorganised - still in the direction 
of national ownership - with the entry of BNDE 
subsidiaries IBRASA (28%) and EMBRAMEC (7%) and 
reduction of the family share to 40%; this re-
organisation was apparently brought about by the 
crisis affecting the automobile industry from about 
1975; the eventual outcome was in 1978/79 when 
the carburettor division was sold to a West German 
carburettor firm, Weber, and it is not yet clear 
what changes were effected in the capital structure 
of the remainder of the firm (i.e. the high-precision 
optical division); the 1973 subsidiary has apparent-
ly retained its original ownership structure, 54.5% 
of capital being held by the original family members, 
and 45% by ACF industries (US). 
Evolution of the main company 
The original enterprise began producing optical equipment exclusive-
ly for military use in 1941 (the owner of the firm was reputedly 
inspired by the support to youth promised by Getulio Vargas in the 
late 1930s); from 1951, the firm also began to sell its products 
to the civil market; then, with the stimulus provided by the 
setting up of a Brazilian-based car industry from 1956, the company 
established a carburettor division, with sales directed especially 
towards the American car firms (Chrysler, Ford, General Motors); 
American technology, (especially from Bendix) was important, as was 
also the operation of the financing import/sales subsidiary created 
in 1963, especially through executive contacts with directors of 
firms; by the early 1970s carburettors accounted for 80% of 
sales. 
Composition of sales 1972-75 














The implication from the sales figures is that the firm's optical 
division began to resume its former importance after the crisis 
affecting the car industry reduced carburettor sales. 
Technology 
As mentioned above, US technology was especially important to the 
firm's carburettor development - especially the use of Zenith type 
carburettors; to some extent, however, the American technology 
and product became less advantageous, owing to competing West 
German-based technology to which other firms had access and which 
allowed such firms to increase their sales base to concerns like 
Volkswagen; nevertheless, it is a widely held view that the 
carburettor products of this company were well made, to a high 
standard, and with versatility of use in Brazil. 
Denationalisation of the firm 
By 1979 the carburettor division was sold to the West German firm 
Weber, after which it has not been possible to determine the 
ownership structure of the remainder of the firm; the circumstances 
surrounding the denationalisation outcome are also somewhat ambiguous 
but the evidence reviewed below appears to show how oligopolistic 
practices and multinational competition can affect the outcome for 
Brazilian private enterprise: 
In 1974-75, after the completion of negotiations between Fiat and 
the state government of Minas Gerais concerning the installation 
of a major new Fiat car plant in Belo Horizonte (Betim), unpublished 
documents (circa 1975) reveal that the Italian group Fiat were 
attempting to bring a German carburettor manufacturer (Weber) to 
Brazil; this intention was perceived as a threat to existing 
Brazilian manufacturers of the product, including the case study 
firm, which might have anticipated losing out completely in winning 
sales to Fiat, since Fiat is preferentially orientated to the use 
of West German technology. 
It is evident that the case study firm was experiencing some finan-
cial difficulties by 1976, when BNDE subsidiaries entered with 35% 
of the share capital; the saga continued to unfold during 1978 
after the completion of the Fiat plant and the onset of production 
at Betim, and when the fuller effects of economic recession were 
being felt (especially in the car industry) by domestic firms; 
Weber approached the case study firm and offered to buy it out; 
given the considerable share input of BNDE, it was not viewed 
as a positive action for the position of the bank (especially 
concerning its attempts to keep companies in national hands 
where possible), and some negotiations were entered into with the 
firm in Case Study No.l (involving also intervention at the level 
of the Brazilian President) to endeavour to retain the firm in 
Brazilian hands; these efforts apparently failed, since the terms 
offered by Weber were superior to alternative proposals, in the 
view of the firm owner. 
The changes effected after the sale of the carburettor division are 
not easy to trace; reliable sources indicated that by the end of 
1979, the carburettor plant was still producing the usual product, 
but that there were some problems over quality, arising from labour 
problems (especially high turnover); it is presumed that the 
optical division has continued in production and it appears that 
BNDE has retained its shares in the firm, although perhaps at a 
reduced level. 
Foundation: 1945 
Location: Rio de Janeiro (although the company is reputed to 
have relocated recently within Rio to one of the 
new industrial estates: Paciencia). 
Ownership: 83.3% national, 16.6% foreign (Mitsubishi Electric 
Corporation, Japan) circa 1974; IBRASA holds 
about 22% of Preference capital and 9% of the 
Ordinary. 
Products: The firm began producing electric lifts, but from 
1968 it also began producing power systems for 
telecommunications and energy generation. 
Sales: In 1973 energy contracts accounted for 75% of total 
contracts; in national terms, the company accounts 
for about 20% of value contracted by the telecom-
munications sector for power systems,and ranks 
second after Ericsson. 
Technology: Has contracts with Mitsubishi for technical assis-
tance and 'know-how1; it recently began production 
of motor control panels for Mitsubishi in Brazil. 






Canoas (Rio Grande do Sul); 
Recife and Manaus. 
and subsidiaries in 
Technology: 
Problems: 
At least 80% appears to be national (possibly more) 
with up to 20% held by Rockwell US (formerly the 
Admiral Corporation); IBRASA has held some shares 
in the company since 1975. 
The company originally began in the import-export 
business, especially imports of air conditioners; 
in 1952, the company entered a new phase, with the 
onset of production of household fridges and other 
consumer durables such as radio and T.V. as well as 
air conditioners; the plants in the Northeast and 
Manaus specialise in conditioners of various types, 
while the main company in Canoas has a more diver-
sified output. 
From 1957 the company has had contracts for techni-
cal assistance with the US Admiral Corp. (now 
Rockwell). 
Marketing (because the firm has bases distant from 
major national markets); high administrative costs; 
only one product of national importance (in the 
air conditioner market); technological dependence. 
1938 
Santa Barbara d'Oeste (5 plants, not all on same 
site) and one plant in Santo Andre; also has a 
subsidiary in Recife. 
100% national; no BNDE share participation, but 
the firm receives financing through the bank. 
The company began producing agricultural equipment 
in the interior of Sao Paulo state; it later 
became specialised in lathes (and various components) 
for light to very heavy uses, and for use with 
different types of materials (plastics, metals,etc.); 
it ranks among the top 6 firms in Brazil for lathe 
production (notably, 5 out of the 6 are Brazilian-
owned) . 
90% of production is for the Brazilian market, with 
10% for export (the company accounted for 70% of 
total Brazilian lathe exports in the 1972-76 
period); the company also has a sales network and 
sales representatives abroad, and holds a commercial 
contract with a German concern; among its main 
clients are some of Brazil's largest firms from 
both private and public sectors, as well as a 
number of MNC enterprises, some of which are shown 
below: 
Private Brazilian clients: Agos Villares, 
Equipamentos Clark, Maquinas Varga, Zanini, Dedini, 
Emaq; 
Public sector clients: Volta Redonda (CSN), 
USIMINAS, CVRD, Petrobras, RFFSA; 
MNCs: Ford do Brasil, General Motors, Volkswagen, 
Fiat, Voith. 
The company has a high degree of self-contained 
technology, and it has always invested in tech-
nology; nevertheless, it has had a number of 
licensing and technology transfer arrangements with 
MNCs, including; a licence for plastic injection 
equipment manufacture from the Package Machinery 
Co (US); royalty payments to Wilhelm Hegenschadt 











1957 (although with precedents back to 1943). 
Sao Paulo Municipio and new factory in interior: 
Sorocaba. 
National 62.9%; foreign 37.1% (Swiss accounts for 
30%). 
8 classes - heat exchangers and coolers; distil-
lation pipes; industrial ovens; mixing equipment; 
petroleum exploration equipment; pressure storage 
tanks; railway equipment; miscellaneous; the 
larger part of this production would be to speci-
fication (i.e. sob encomenda) as opposed to mass 
produced items (seriados). 
According to ABDIB (the Brazilian association for 
basic industries), between 14-20% of national total 
sales of products in the above fields are accounted 
for by the company. 
In 1976/77, sales to the Petrochemical industry 
(especially Petrobras) and the rail transport 
sector accounted for 75% and 14% of sales respec-
tively. 
Brazilian-produced steel accounts for the bulk of 
raw inputs, with a large proportion of the total 
coming from USIMINAS. 
While the company has developed some of its own 
technology, it has a variety of contracts with 
mainly US and UK firms; some of the main ones in 
the 1970s were with: Heat Transfer Research Co; 
Hudson Products Corp; Brown Fintube Co; 
Glitsch Inc.; Whiting Corp. 
The problem of competition with firms in similar 
fields (many of them private Brazilian concerns) 
is perhaps a major one; there are perhaps at 
least 20 other competing firms; nevertheless, this 
company has about 25% of the heat exchanger market, 
75% of that for air coolers, and 60% of that for 
oil and gas separators; a further problem concerns 
the heavy dependence on public sector orders (es-
pecially in petroleum fields) which might bring 
difficulties in view of public sector spending cuts. 
Foundation: 1953 
Location: Limeira (near Campinas),Sao Paulo state. 
Ownership: The main company appears to have been at least 
95% national until 1971, when Lucas (UK) entered 
the company with profound repercussions on company 
statutes and ownership structure; presently the 
company is about 70% national and 30% foreign 
(Lucas UK); in 1974 a new subsidiary was set up 
(in a related field), this being 75% national and 
25% foreign-owned (Midland Ross Corp., US). 
Products: The main company is a leading manufacturer of 
automobile brakes and accessories (in 1975, 
it was second in Brazil after Bendix in this pro-
duction) ; founding (of metal) is also an impor-
tant related activity. 
Sales: Predominantly to Brazilian car industry, including 
Volkswagen, General Motors, Mercedes Benz, and also 
to heavy vehicle market suppliers such as Massey 
Ferguson, Chrysler, etc. 
Exports: Apparently difficult owing to lack of compatibility 
with systems used abroad. 
Financing: Has received substantial long-term financing from 
BNDE, especially for an expansion programme launched 
in 1974. 
Technology: Presumably Lucas is an important supplier of 
technological inputs to the company, although the 
expansion programme under way from 1974 is designed 
to foster technological development within the firm. 
The material presented in this paper has perhaps raised more 
questions than have been answered. Yet there is scope for 
tentative conclusions to be drawn about the position and role of 
Brazilian private enterprise during a vital period of the 
country's industrialisation process. 
Before 1950, the country's industrial base, though already 
substantial by Latin American standards, was still largely com-
posed of traditional industries in the hands of private Brazilian 
interests. Subsequently, structural changes took place, 
especially involving the diversification and increasing capacity 
of industry on the one hand, and greater public sector and foreign 
participation on the other. These changes reduced the Brazilian 
private component within the resulting overall ownership structure. 
They also account for the dominance of multinational firms in 
most of the dynamic industries, and public sector pre-eminence in 
basic industries such as steel and petroleum, particularly in 
view of the large-scale investments these industries have required. 
While these developments may be viewed as disadvantageous 
to industrialisation by local enterprises, there is clear evidence 
that Brazilian concerns of all sizes have been able to establish 
themselves (or expand) in the dynamic sectors in considerable 
numbers. Moreover, the majority of firms have done so by their 
own efforts - initially at least. Having said this, some quali-
fications must be made. 
In particular, Brazilian private enterprises, although often 
being predominant in firm numbers, tend to be of much smaller scale 
than their competitors, with implications for the share of assets 
and sales. Further, in many cases local firms have had to make 
greater use of foreign technologies (and equipment) in their 
production techniques to be able to supply the market for com-
ponents required by MNCs. This may be seen as one factor con-
tributing to the lack of technological development by Brazilian 
firms themselves. In addition to making royalty payments to, 
and buying items of equipment from, foreign concerns, domestic 
companies have frequently had to cede some of their control by 
taking on foreign partners. This was implicit in several of the 
case studies, and although it can be argued that this procedure 
reduces risk for the local company the benefits may be limited if 
the foreign concerns succeed in penetrating too large a number of 
firms. 
The evidence on growth and survival pointed to a rapid 
turnover of firms and the vulnerability of small and medium firms. 
Peaks in insolvencies also demonstrated that rather than simply 
being associated with economic decline, they were also apparent 
during expansion phases suggesting that survival is especially 
affected by rapid changes in the economic climate whatever the 
direction of change. 
Further costs to Brazilian private enterprise may be implicit 
in aspects arising from the locational analysis. The power of 
market concentration by MNC firms is one element which can produce 
marked distortions in the economic environment affecting local 
firms. Moreover, it is apparent that increasing numbers of 
local firms have become strongly reliant upon sales to either 
multinational subsidiaries operating in Brazil or to public sector 
enterprises, thus perhaps inhibiting the development of stronger 
reciprocal links among Brazilian private concerns as well as 
making such concerns more vulnerable to financial collapse in times 
of economic stringency. 
Taken together, the above observations suggest that much of 
Brazil's private industry exists in a somewhat precarious state. 
A key question for its future survival and role clearly concerns 
the extent to which the country's industrialisation course con-
tinues to be dominated by high technology, capital-intensive 
production. 
NOTES 
1. UN Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, New York, United 
Nations, 1976. 
2. Figures quoted in Bank of London and South America Review, 
Vol.14, May 1980, p.119. 
3. See: Conjuntura Economica, Vol.31 (12), Rio de Janeiro, 
December 1977, pp.82-100, and especially Table 1, p.85. 
4. Historically, the Southeast (Sudeste) gained in importance 
after the discovery of gold during the late 17th century in 
the interior of Minas Gerais state; the 'town* of Rio de 
Janeiro became the main outlet for gold exports and was 
created capital of Brazil by the Portuguese in 1763. 
5. See Chapter 10 of Baer (1975), A Industrializagao e o 
Desenvolvimento Economico do Brasil, '0 surto brasileiro, 
1968-73.1 
6. Bank of London and South America Review, Vol.14, May 1980, 
p.119. 
7. By the early 1970s Brazil was importing at least 20 million 
tons of crude oil annually, in addition to other products 
such as gasoline (3m tons), diesel fuel oil and lubricants 
(1m tons). This compares with imports of less than 50,000 
tons of crude oil, 2m tons of gasoline and 3m tons of diesel 
fuel and lubricants in 1950. 
8. The Ministry of Industry was established by Law 3,782 of 
22.7.60. 
9. Among these, Petroquisa, the subsidiary of Petrobras, has 
been especially important in chemicals and related industry. 
10. On 18th June 1980, the Economic Development Council (CDE) 
approved new measures largely aimed at reducing expenditure 
by the public sector; these cuts will affect direct invest-
ments by State companies (15% cut) and public sector imports 
(cut by about 30%). Further cuts were also announced at the 
end of 1980. 
11. In 1979, the latest year for which information was available, 
FDI totalled about US$ 15,963 m. 
12. Bank of London and South America Review, Vol.14, May 1980, 
p.119; ibid., Nov. 1980, p.244. 
13. Finame was set up by Decree 55,275 of 22.12.64; Fipeme was 
also set up, in the following year, as a financing agency 
for small and medium enterprises. 
14. Recently (during 1979) this agency has turned specific 
attention to the problems of micro-firms (microempresas) 
throughout Brazil (micro-firms are those with 10 employees 
or less). 
15. For a review of CDI operations, see: Cunningham, S., 
'Brazil: recent trends in industrial development1, Bank of 
London and South America Review, Vol.13, April 1979, 
pp.212-220. Several paragraphs from this article appear on 
PP. 7-8. 
16. This evidence comes from mimeographed copies of the original 
documents supplied by one of the authors in Brazil. 
17. This document was titled Apoio a Empresa Privada Nacional, 
Brasilia, 30.3.77. 
18. The document was issued by the business daily Gazeta Mercantil 
at the Forum set up by this concern; the title of the 
document was Primeiro Documento dos Empresarios (better known 
as 'the document of the group of eight') in Sao Paulo, July 
1978, and it was signed by the following: Claudio Bardella, 
Severo Gomes, Jose Mindlin, Antonio Ermirio de Moraes, 
Paulo Villares, Paulo d'Arrigo Velhinho, Laerte Setubal Filho, 
and Jorge Gerdau Johannpeter. 
19. Concrete cases are difficult to document, but see Evans 
(1971, 1977 and 1979) for some further coverage of this 
aspect. 
20. This classification may not be compatible with those elsewhere; 
for example, the Brazilian 'large' group may only correspond 
to medium-sized concerns in Europe or USA. 
21. These were treated as two separate groups in the original 
study. 
22. This was the Lewis Learmonth Uniform Random Number Generator 
(Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey, California). 
23. See Rattner, H. et al, 1979, Table 3.15, p.100, and Table 
3.20, p.103. 
24. It appears that the data are for firms affected in the cities 
of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. 
25. Boletim da Associagao Comercial de Sao Paulo (annual). 
26. Visao began publishing this annual survey in 1967, but only 
from 1974 has it given more detailed breakdowns of ownership; 
Visao classifies firms as MNCs when more than 50% of share 
capital is in the hands of the MNC. Most of the results 
contained in the analysis and discussion between pages 20 & 27 
were incorporated in an article by the author for The 
Professional Geographer titled 'Multinational Enterprises in 
Brazil: Regional Development Implications1 (February 1981). 
27. According to data for Patrimonio Liquido (net worth) shown in 
the Visao survey, 1979. 
28. For some relevant background to incentive policy in the 
Northeast, see Hirschman, A.O., 'Industrial Development in 
the Brazilian Northeast and the Tax Credit Scheme of 34/18' 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol.5, 1968, pp.1-28; 
Goodman, D.E. and Cavalcanti, R., Incentivos a industriali-
zagao do Nordeste, Rio de Janeiro, IPEA, 1974. 
29. Fiscal incentives are generally open to all firms, and not 
specifically designed for MNCs. 
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